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The design of IoT systems could benefit from the combination of two different analyses. We perform
a first analysis to approximate how data flow across the system components, while the second analysis
checks their communication soundness. We show how the combination of these two analyses yields
further benefits hardly achievable by separately using each of them. We exploit two independently
developed tools for the analyses.
Firstly, we specify IoT systems in IoT-LySa, a simple specification language featuring asyn-
chronous multicast communication of tuples. The values carried by the tuples are drawn from a
term-algebra obtained by a parametric signature. The analysis of communication soundness is sup-
ported by ChorGram, a tool developed to verify the compatibility of communicating finite-state
machines. In order to combine the analyses we implement an encoding of IoT-LySa processes into
communicating machines. This encoding is not completely straightforward because IoT-LySa has
multicast communications with data, while communication machines are based on point-to-point
communications where only finitely many symbols can be exchanged. To highlight the benefits of
our approach we appeal to a simple yet illustrative example.
1 Introduction
Software is hardly built anymore as a stand-alone application. Over the last decades, the rise of dis-
tributed and concurrent applications has determined a crucial entanglement between computation and
communication [16]. This phenomenon increasingly makes adaptability, reconfigurability, and openness
paramount requirements of software. Therefore, it is nowadays crucial for designers and software engi-
neers to take into account both properties of computation and communication when developing systems.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most advanced technological frontiers of the combination of
computation and communication. By definition, IoT systems are made of several components that inter-
act within complex (cyber-)physical environments. This emerging technology provides the momentum
for the creation of new societal and economical opportunities, as long as IoT systems become trustwor-
thy. Indeed, the great disruptive innovation that IoT systems can offer comes with an equally great threat:
it is extremely hard to guarantee correctness properties of those systems. In fact, the overall correctness
becomes the resultant of that of communication and that of computation. In Bruce Schneier’s words:
«The Internet of Things is fundamentally changing how computers get incorporated into our
lives. Through the sensors, we’re giving the Internet eyes and ears. Through the actuators,
we’re giving the Internet hands and feet. Through the processing – mostly in the cloud –
we’re giving the Internet a brain. Together, we’re creating an Internet that senses, thinks,
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and acts. This is the classic definition of a robot, and I contend that we’re building a world-
sized robot without even realizing it.» [4]
These issues are particularly critical because of the apparently easy use of IoT technologies hides
their not trivial design, that becomes evident only when something goes wrong, e.g. when privacy can
be compromised. Among many others, a recent example is that of a smart doll 1 that allows children
to access the Internet via speech recognition software, and to control the toy via an app. However, this
smart technology enables an attacker to also access personal data.
In this paper, we consider a simple yet realistic scenario to illustrate how to verify properties of
IoT systems that arise from this prominent mix of computation and communication. We advocate the
combination of two different techniques for supporting verification. To analyse the “computational di-
mension” we appeal to a static analysis technique that allows us to check control and data flow properties
of systems. The soundness of “communication dimension” is instead verified through a choreographic
framework. More precisely, we combine the analysis defined on IoT-LySa [9, 8] (a specification language
tailored to IoT) and the analysis of communication soundness based on communicating finite-state ma-
chines (CFSMs) and global graphs [14].
An IoT system is specified as a set of IoT-LySa components that communicate through an asyn-
chronous multicast mechanism. The values communicated in the system are drawn from a term-algebra
obtained by a parametric signature. The control flow analysis for IoT-LySa [9] over-approximates the
values that can be assigned to the local variables of a component, as well as where these values origi-
nated. This analysis allows designers to spot potential mistakes on how data are handled by components.
In addition, the analysis computes the messages that a node may receive, but not the order in which they
arrive, and it is thus insufficient for establishing the communication soundness.
Communication soundness is therefore checked by mapping the components to CFSMs and using
ChorGram [13], a tool developed to verify the compatibility of communicating finite-state machines [14].
The compatibility property checked by ChorGram is defined in [14] and it is a condition guaranteeing
absence of deadlocks, message obliviousness (i.e. messages sent but not received) [5], and of unspecified
reception (i.e. a component receiving unexpected messages). We show how ChorGram flags possible
communication mistakes when the set of CFSMs is not compatible and allows the designer to determine
where the problem arises. Differently from the control flow analysis, the one made with ChorGram is
insensitive to the data exchanged through the messages.
The main contribution of this paper is showing that the control flow analysis and the analysis of
communication soundness based on a choreographic framework complement each other, and that it is
worthwhile combining them for formally verifying IoT systems.
Structure of the paper After reviewing the choreographic framework and IoT-LySa (cf. Section 2),
we describe our running example and model it in IoT-LySa (cf. Section 3). Section 3 also shows how
the analysis of the IoT-LySa specification can lead to detecting mistakes in the computation and help in
fixing the errors. Section 5 illustrates how to use ChorGram to analyse the communication behaviour
of our running example. This analysis flags some unexpected misbehaviour and helps fixing the prob-
lem. In order to combine these analyses Section 4 describes an encoding of the IoT-LySa systems into
communicating machines. This encoding is not straightforward because IoT-LySa features multicast
communications with data while communication machines are based on point-to-point communications
1See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/17/german-parents-told-to-destroy-
my-friend-cayla-doll-spy-on-children
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(a) Example of a system of CFSMs (b) Global graph
Figure 1: A choreographic model
where only finitely many symbols can be exchanged. Technical details are given in the appendices. Our
concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 A choreographic framework for distributed systems
Choreographies advocate the so-called local and global views for specifying the behaviour of a system.
In the first, one specifies the asynchronous communication behaviour of each component “in isolation”,
while the interactions among the system components are seen as atomic actions that abstract away from
asynchrony. Using a simple example, we will review the key ingredients of the local and global views
adopted here, namely communicating finite-state machines [11] and (a variant of) global graphs [12].
Local view Communicating finite-state machines (CFSMs) are a conceptually simple model for the
analysis of communication protocols. A CFSM is basically a finite-state automaton with transitions that
represent send or receive actions. Each machine is uniquely identified by a name and we use A, B, etc. to
range over identifiers of CFSMs. A system consists of finitely many CFSMs that share unbounded FIFO
channels to exchange messages. More precisely, for each pair A and B of CFSMs there is a channel
from A to B (dubbed A ·B) and a channel in the other direction (dubbed B ·A). The use of buffers
realises an asynchronous semantics: senders simply deposit messages in buffers without synchronising
with receivers. We illustrate the semantics of CFSMs by considering the system of three machines A,
B, and C in Figure 1(a). Machine A repeatedly sends message loop to machine B until message exit
is sent to machine C. Machine B will consume any message sent by A and then wait for a message
exit in the buffer C ·B from C. Finally, C forwards message exit to B once it has received it from A.
The configuration of a system is a snapshot that records the states in which each machine is in, and the
contents of each channel. Initially, all CFSMs are in their initial states and buffers are empty. When,
in the current configuration, a machine is in a state with an outgoing output transition, labelled say by
A ·B!m, then the output transition can be fired and move the machine A to the target state of the transition.
At the same time the message m is deposited in the buffer A ·B. Similarly, if the machine is in a state
with an outgoing input transition, labelled say by A ·B?m, and the head of the buffer contains message
m then the input transition can be fired removing m from the buffer and moving the machine to the target
state of the transition. For instance, the system of our example in Figure 1(a) can reach the following
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configuration (from its initial one)
〈A : q,B : q0,C : q0 ; A ·B : [loop, . . . , loop],A ·C : [exit],C ·B : [], . . .〉
where (i) A is in state q while machines B and C are in state q0 and (ii) the buffer A ·B contains a number
of loop messages, the buffer A ·C contains the message exit, and all the remaining buffers are empty. For
simplicity, suppose that A sends only one loop message and then an exit message. In this configuration,
both B and C can consume the message in their queues from A; if the input of C is fired then the system
reaches the configuration
〈A : q,B : q0,C : q ; A ·B : [loop],A ·C : [],C ·B : [], . . .〉
from where both the input of loop of B and the output from state q of C are enabled and can be non-
deterministically fired. Observe that the computation where A never sends message exit is possible; this
will make A and B interact forever, while C will be waiting.
Global view A global graph yields the description of the distributed work-flow of components ex-
changing messages. We borrow global graphs from [14] to formalise the global views of choreographies;
an example of these graphs is in Figure 1(b). The nodes of a global graph are labelled2 by (resp ) to
mark the starting (resp. termination) point of the choreography; by A→ B : m to indicate that participant
A and B exchange message m (A being the sender and B the receivers); by to indicate either a choice,
merge, or the entry-point of an iteration; or by to indicate either the start or the end of concurrent
interactions. For example, the starting point of the global graph in Figure 1(b) is followed by the entry
point of an iteration; the body of the iteration is a choice between two branches: in the left-most branch
A and B exchange the message loop and go back to the entry point of the iteration; in the right-most
branch A and C exchange the message exit followed by an exchange of the same message between C and
B, followed by a sink node where no further interactions happen.
An intuition of the semantics of a global graph can be given in terms of a “token game” similar to
the one of Petri nets. The token starts from the initial node and follows the arcs of the graph; when the
node reaches a choice node it continues along one branch; when the node reaches a fork node ,
new tokens start to flow along all the arcs and, dually, when all the tokens of the incoming arcs of a join
gate are present then one token continues along the outgoing arc of the gate. For example, in our global
graph, after the start, the machines either engage in an iteration where A and B exchange loop or A sends
the message exit to C, which in turn forwards it to B after which the protocol terminates.
In this paper, we will use ChorGram [13] a toolkit, based on the results of [14], that allows to
reconstruct a global graph out of a system of CFSMs. In fact, ChorGram generates the presented global
graph starting from the machines A, B, and C above.
As said above, systems of CFSMs evolve by moving from one configuration to another. If commu-
nication misbehaviours happen then “bad” configurations may be reached. A machine is in a sending
(resp. receiving) state if all its outgoing transitions are send (resp. receive) actions. A state without any
outgoing transition is said to be final. A state that is neither final, nor sending nor receiving is a mixed
state. A system of CFSMs is communication sound if none of its reachable configurations is a deadlock
and it is not message oblivious [5], where
2 The notation of the global graphs used in [14] is reminiscent of BPMN choreography [1]. The reader familiar with BPMN
should note that our -node corresponds to the × and × gateways in BPMN, while our -node corresponds to the +
gateway in BPMN.
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• a configuration is a deadlock if all the buffers are empty, there is at least one machine in a receiving
state, and all the other machines are either in a receiving state or in a final state;
• a system is not message oblivious [5] if whenever a message has been sent by a participant, that
message will be eventually received.3
Since CFSMs are Turing-complete, communication soundness is not decidable. However, systems en-
joying the generalised multiparty compatibility (GMC) [14] are guaranteed to be sound and GMC is
a decidable property supported by the ChorGram toolkit [15]. We will give an intuition of the GMC
property in Section 5.
2.2 An overview of IoT-LySa
The language We review IoT-LySa [9, 8], a specification language recently proposed for designing
IoT systems. IoT-LySa is based on a process calculus and it has a specific focus on data collecting,
aggregation, and communication. Indeed, by using IoT-LySa primitives designers can model the structure
of a system and the interactions among the smart objects it is made of. A smart object is represented by
a node that specifies multiple processes interacting through a shared local store, as well as sensors and
actuators. In IoT-LySa store accesses are assumed as atomic. The processes are in charge of detailing
how data are to be processed and exchanged among the nodes. A sensor of a node ` is an active entity
that reads data from the physical environment at its own fixed rate, and deposits them in the local store
of `. Actuators instead are passive: they just wait for a command to become active and operate on
the environment. The current version of IoT-LySa is specifically designed to model monitoring system
typical of smart cities, factories or farms. In this scenario, smart objects never leave their locations, while
mobile entities, such as cars or people, carry no smart device and can only trigger sensors.
Communications in IoT systems often occur in a disciplined broadcasting manner. For that, IoT-
LySa features a simple multicast communication among nodes. For example, the output of the first
thermometer node Th1 at line 25 in Figure 3
snd (temp,mt) to [Th,Th2]
specifies that the message (temp,mt) has to be sent to two nodes, namely the thermostat Th and the second
thermometer Th2 (we will come back on this example in Section 3). The reception of a message is also
done in a disciplined way: the receiver filters the messages flowing in the ether and only accepts some of
them according to a sort of guard, following [7]. For example, consider the input of the thermostat node
Th in Figure 2 at line 7
recv(temp;x)
The message described above passes the check, because what is at the left of the “ ;” in the payload,
namely the guard temp, matches with the first element of the message sent. Then the value stored in
mt is assigned to the variable x, as usual. If the guard is not passed, Th simply ignores the message.
(Of course, the above extends to tuples of guards and of binding values.) This filtering input enables
us to explicitly implement external choices, through the switch primitive. It was not originally included
in [9, 8] although the construct can be encoded there.
We now intuitively describe other elements of IoT-LySa on the snippet of code in Figure 2. As
done already, for readability, in this paper we are using a sugared syntax, from which the original IoT-
LySa code can be easily extracted (see Appendix A). The thermostat node Th we are considering has no
3Like eventual reception [6], message obliviousness is stronger than the no-orphan message property; a non message obliv-
ious system is also free of orphan messages.
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1 node Th =
2 ac tua to r ACon_off : o n o f f _ t = rec h . w a i t _ f o r ( turnon , t u r n o f f ) ; h
3
4 process =
5 rec h .
6 swi tch {
7 recv ( temp ; x ) ;
8 i f t t h r e s h o l d < x then
9 @ACon_off . turnon ;
10 snd ( ack , on ) to [ Th1 ] ;
11 h
12 else
13 @ACon_off . t u r n o f f ;
14 snd ( ack , o f f ) to [ Th1 ] ;
15 h
16 |
17 recv ( q u i t ; i ) ;
18 n i l
19 }
Figure 2: The specification of a thermostat Th in IoT-LySa
sensors and a single actuator ACon_off. It is part of the system further discussed in Section 3 that keeps
the temperature of a room under control with an air conditioning, and that includes two further nodes,
describing two thermometers.
The behaviour of the actuator ACon_off (line 2) depends on commands turnon and turnoff to start and
stop the air conditioning, respectively. (Note that the actual behaviour is not described, as the physical
environment is seen as a black box.) The behaviour of the node Th is an iterative process (lines 5-19).
The loop consists of an external choice rendered with the switch command that declares two branches
guarded by two mutually exclusive inputs recv. More precisely, the first branch is executed when the
node receives a message with guard temp (line 7). The node checks if the temperature x is below or
above a given threshold, instructs the actuator, and sends an acknowledgement accordingly (lines 8-14).
The second case is when the node receives the message with guard quit (line 17): the process sends an
acknowledgement and terminates.
The control flow analysis A control flow analysis (CFA) that safely approximates the behaviour of
IoT-LySa systems has been given in [9]. The analysis tracks how sensor values are used inside their
local nodes, how they are aggregated and propagated to other nodes, and which messages are exchanged
among nodes. As any other static analysis it mimics the evolution of a system, collecting the relevant
information. In this case it traverses the text of the system and records the effects of each possible
aggregation function application, of the assignments on the variables used in the specification, as well as
those of the possible inter-node communications. As expected, the analysis uses abstract values in place
of concrete ones.
Roughly speaking, the abstract values of the data generated by an IoT system describe their prove-
nance and how they are aggregated during the computations. A natural way of abstracting concrete data
would then be through trees, the leaves of which either represent sensor names (to identify the sensors
from which values come) or other “primitive” (abstract) values, e.g. constants. The aggregation functions
then combine available trees to obtain new ones. However, IoT systems typically have feedback loops
(as in our running example), which are realised by some iterative behaviour. This may prevent us from
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statically determining safe approximants of aggregated data, because we cannot establish how many
applications of aggregation functions are necessary by only inspecting the code. The analysis of [10]
resorts therefore to tree grammars for keeping finite the abstract values and for improving the precision
of the analysis in [9], where instead trees are cut at a fixed depth.
We will come back on the above rather technical issue in Section 3, and here we only intuitively
illustrate the results of the analysis and some of its possible uses. For each node ` in the network, the
analysis returns:
• a map Σ̂` assigning to each sensor and each variable a set of the abstract values (safely representing
the actual values) that they may assume at run time (recall that each node has its own local store);
• a set κ(`) that over-approximates the set of messages received by the node `, and for each of them
its sender (basically, an element of κ(`) is a pair sender-tuple of abstract values);
• a set Θ(`) of possible abstract values, i.e. tree grammars, computed and used by the node `.
The components κ and Θ track how data may flow in the network and how they influence the outcome
of aggregation functions.
The result of the analysis concerning the node Th in Figure 2, is as follows. We will discuss in more
detail this example in Section 3.
• Σ̂ predicts, among other facts, that x may (and actually will) store the temperature as computed by
the thermometers and sent through the message (temp,mt) mentioned above;
• κ contains the pair consisting of the termometer Th1 (the sender of the message) and an abstract
value for the temperature, because of the input on line 7;
• Θ predicts that the node Th may handle values (those stored in x) that are abstractly represented
by a grammar that generates trees with unbounded depth.
The results of the analysis provide designers with the basis for detecting possible flaws on the usage
of data as early as possible during the design phase. They can also be used for checking and certifying
various properties of IoT systems. For example, one can inspect the component κ for verifying if the
value of a certain sensor reaches a specific smart object in the network and, with the component Θ, if
it is used as expected. This kind of checks will be shown in Section 3 on the system in Figure 3. One
can see there that the value of the temperature of Th1 is indeed received by the component Th2, but never
used, suggesting that the specification in hand is flawed. In addition, a designer can check if the system
conforms to the security requirements in force, so IoT-LySa supports a security by design development
mode. For example, the CFA is used in [8] to verify secrecy and a classical access control policy. Indeed,
one can inspect the component κ and see if a secret value flows in clear on the network. Other policies
are also checked in [10].
In order to experiment on the CFA, we had to adapt the one in [9, 10], so as to take into account the
new constructs for the external choice mentioned above. In particular, our extensions help in establishing
a finer relation between the program points where a message is sent and where it is received. The
implementation of the constraint solver for this improved CFA is still in an early stage of development,
and is not described here.
3 CFA at Work
We now describe our simple scenario and show how to analyse it using the CFA described in Section 2.2.
Suppose you have to design an IoT system for keeping the temperature of a room under control through
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an air conditioner. The system, dubbed ACC (after AC controller), consists of three nodes each specify-
ing a “smart” object: the thermostat discussed in Section 2, and two thermometers, dubbed Th1 and Th2,
which communicate through a wireless network. We assume that thermometers have different physical
features: Th1 works on batteries for the lack of sockets in the corner of the room where it is positioned,
while Th2 is mains powered.
A first version of the specification is in Figure 3, where we omit the thermostat displayed in Figure 2.
A specification defines, before the behaviour of nodes, a signature declaring the types, functions, and
constants used inside nodes. The signature of our example is on lines 1-6 of Figure 3 and specifies
the constants used in our scenario. The syntax of a constant definition is func <name>:<type> where
func is a keyword and <type> can be a primitive type as int , bool and float or user-defined abstract
types.4 The first four constants are used in the messages exchanged in the system, the last two represent
the temperature threshold checked by the thermostat Th in Figure 2 and the battery threshold tested by
Th1 (line 18). This node has sensors Temp1 and Battery; the first cyclically senses the environment
through the probe operation, and returns a value of type float representing the temperature; similarly,
the other sensor returns a float representing the battery level; the actions tau occurring at lines 12, 13
and 45 denote internal activities not relevant here, e.g. noise reduction, value normalization, etc. Sensors
operate at certain rates not explicitly given in the specification.
We first consider the behaviour of Th2, specified at lines 44-55. The thermometer uses the sensor
Temp2 and repeatedly
• sends the current local temperature mt, initially set to zero;
• receives the temperature (sent by Th1) in its local variable x;
• re-assigns mt with half of the current temperature sensed by Temp2.
Clearly, the last step is not what we have in mind, i.e. re-assigning mt with the average of the current
temperature sensed by Temp2 and the one received from Th1 (see the fixed version at line 10 in Figure 5).
We will see below how the CFA detects this simple error.
The behaviour of Th1 is more complex because it also interacts with Th, provided that its battery has
enough charge. The node Th1 has two parallel processes that share the local store. In particular they both
share and use the variable mt. The first process repeatedly
• receives in x the temperature sent by Th2 (line 19);
• computes the average with the current recorded temperature (lines 20-22);
• either sends the computed temperature to Th2 only (line 30, when the number i of iterations is not
10) or it multicasts the temperature to both Th and Th2 (line 25, when i = 10);
• waits for an ack,
provided that the battery power is over the threshold bthreshold. Otherwise, Th1 stops the interactions
with Th (lines 33-34). The second process (lines 36-40) simply pings Th2, by continuously receiving and
storing the temperatures received from Th2.
The results of our first analysis of ACC concern the usage of data and are in Figure 4. As said
above, aggregation functions occurring in a process can grow terms of unbound depth. For example,
the variable i of Th2 gets increasingly actual values, starting from 0, as the simple aggregation function
+ is applied to the value just computed and 1. Abstractly, this would be represented by a tree of the
4 At the moment IoT-LySa supports the declaration of abstract types through the syntax type <name>. A more powerful
and general form of user-defined data types is left as future work.
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1 func q u i t : i n t
2 func temp : i n t
3 func on : bool
4 func o f f : bool
5 func t t h r e s h o l d : f l o a t
6 func b thresho ld : f l o a t
7
8 / * the enumerated type of ac t i ons t h a t the ac tua to r o f the Th can perform : * /
9 ac tua to r_ type o n o f f _ t { turnon , t u r n o f f }
10
11 node Th1 =
12 sensor Temp1 : f l o a t = rec h . tau ; probe ; h
13 sensor Ba t te ry : f l o a t = rec h . tau ; probe ; h
14
15 process =
16 i : = 0 ;
17 rec h .
18 i f b th resho ld < Ba t te ry then
19 recv ( temp ; x ) ;
20 t : = Temp1 ;
21 tp : = t + x ;
22 mt : = tp / 2 ;
23 i : = i + 1 ;
24 i f i = 10 then
25 snd ( temp , mt ) to [ Th , Th2 ] ;
26 recv ( ack ; j ) ;
27 i : = 0 ;
28 h
29 else
30 snd ( temp , mt ) to [ Th2 ] ;
31 h
32 else
33 snd ( qu i t , 0 ) to [ Th ] ;
34 n i l
35
36 process =
37 rec h .
38 recv ( temp ; s ) ;
39 mt : = s ;
40 h
41
42
43
44 node Th2 =
45 sensor Temp2 : f l o a t = rec h . tau ; probe ; h
46
47 process =
48 mt : = 0 ;
49 rec h .
50 snd ( temp , mt ) to [ Th1 ] ;
51 recv ( temp ; x ) ;
52 t : = Temp2 ;
53 tp : = t ;
54 mt : = tp / 2 ;
55 h
Figure 3: The specification of ACC in IoT-LySa
form +(1,+ (1,... + (0,1)...), where we still represent the abstract function with +, and the tree as the string
resulting from a preorder visit. To keep the representation of abstract values finite (and get rid of their
unknown depth), we use here regular tree grammars, cf. [10]. For saving space, the entries in Figure 4
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are the start symbols of the relevant tree grammars, while their productions are in the lower part of the
figure. Back to our little example, from the expression i+1, the analysis extracts the following grammar,
with start symbol G and the two productions (actually we are omitting some superscripts, see below):
G → 0 | +(G,1)
The first production reflects the assignment at line 16, the second one the occurrence of the aggregation
function in the expression at line 23. The abstract value G is then one of the possible results of the map
Σ̂ on i , as far as the node Th1 is concerned.
As said in Section 2, the component κ of the analysis (over-)approximates the messages that a node
can receive from other nodes. For instance, in our running example
(Th, «ackTh,onTh») ∈ κ(Th1)
results from the analysis of the code in Figure 2 at line 10, and indicates that the thermostat node Th could
send a message (ack,on) to the first thermometer Th1. The superscripts appearing in the abstract values
record the provenance (in this case that the values have been originated from Th). Note in passing that
in the abstract message «ackT h,onT h», ackT h and onT h should rather be replaced by two non-terminals,
acting as start symbols of two tree grammars defining the single leaves ack and on, respectively (see also
Figure 4). For the sake of simplicity, we prefer here to only write the single leaves they generate.
Furthermore, the abstract value onT h is propagated in the component Σ̂:
onT h ∈ Σ̂Th1(j)
This happens because the abstract message «ackT h,onT h» is considered when computing the abstract
value predicted to bind j occurring in recv(ack; j ) at line 26. This propagation reflects that the concrete
value abstracted as onT h can at run-time be stored by Th1 in its local variable j. Also, Th1 accepts two
further messages (the guards match) from Th2, and the analysis says that
(Th2,«tempTh2 ,0Th2»),(Th2,«tempTh2 ,DTh2») ∈ κ(Th1)
The presence of 0Th2 reflects that in the first iteration of Th2 sends 0, the contents of mt. The second
abstract value is DTh2 , the start symbol of the following tree grammar:
DTh2 → /(Temp2Th2 ,2Th2)
This grammar accounts for the chain of assignments at lines 52-54 and, together with Σ̂Th2 , establishes
that Th2 stores in mt half of the actual value sensed by Temp2. Now, these abstract values populate
Σ̂Th1(x), and also flow in Σ̂Th1(mt), because the CFA mimics the execution of lines 20-23. In addition,
the expressions in lines 20 and 22 originate the grammars
FTh1 → +(Temp1Th1 ,0Th2) | +(Temp1Th1 ,DTh2) and DTh1 → /(FTh1 ,2Th1)
Therefore, DTh1 ∈ Σ̂Th1(mt), which is then propagated in Θ(Th1). Note that its language includes the
abstract value /( +(Temp1,/(Temp2,2)),2), predicting that the actual value of mt occurring in Th1 may also
depend on data computed by Th2: this further possibility is recorded by the inclusion DTh2 ∈ Σ̂Th1(mt).
Turning our attention to Th2, we unveil a problem. The analysis correctly predicts that Th2 may
receive the temperature from Th1 because (Th1,«tempTh1 ,DTh1») ∈ κ(Th2). Nonetheless, the CFA
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κ
Th1 {(Th,«ackTh,onTh»),(Th,«ackTh,offTh»),(Th2,«tempTh2 ,0Th2 »),(Th2,«tempTh2 ,DTh2 »)}
Th2 {(Th1,«tempTh1 ,DTh1 »),(Th1,«tempTh1 ,DTh2 »),(Th1,«tempTh1 ,0Th2 »)}
Th {(Th1,«tempTh1 ,DTh1 »),(Th1,«tempTh1 ,DTh2 »),(Th1,«tempTh1 ,0Th2 »),(Th1,«quitTh1 ,0Th1 »)}
Θ
Th1 {DTh1 ,DTh2 ,bthresholdTh1 ,BatteryTh1 ,0Th1 ,GTh1 ,tempTh1 ,Temp1Th1 ,FTh1 ,onTh,offTh,0Th2 ,
1Th1 ,2Th1 ,10Th1}
Th2 {DTh2 ,tempTh2 ,Temp2Th2 ,0Th2 ,2Th2}
Th {DTh1 ,DTh2 ,0Th2 ,0Th1 ,ackTh,onTh,offTh,quitTh,tthresholdTh}
Σ̂Th
x {DTh1 ,DTh2 ,0Th2}
i {0Th1}
Σ̂Th2
mt {0Th2 ,DTh2}
t {Temp2Th2}
tp {Temp2Th2}
x {DTh1 ,DTh2 ,0Th2}
Temp2 {Temp2Th2}
Σ̂Th1
i {0Th1 ,GTh1}
j {onTh,offTh}
mt {DTh1 ,DTh2 ,0Th2}
t {Temp1Th1}
tp {FTh1}
x {0Th2 ,DTh2}
s {0Th2 ,DTh2}
Battery {BatteryTh1}
Temp1 {Temp1Th1}
GTh1 → 0Th1 | +(GTh1 ,1Th1)
DTh1 → /(FTh1 ,2Th1)
FTh1 → +(Temp1Th1 ,0Th2)
| +(Temp1Th1 ,DTh2)
DTh2 → /(Temp2Th2 ,2Th2)
where by abuse of notation, we only write the leaves instead of writing a production, e.g. 0Th1 in place of ZeroTh1 → 0Th1 .
Figure 4: The results of the CFA for the system in Figure 3
shows that average of temperatures in the variable mt of Th2 does not depend on the values received from
Th1, as we would like to be. While the analysis of recv(temp;x) at line 51 causes
DTh1 ∈ Σ̂Th2(x)
Figure 4 shows that instead DTh1 does not occur in Σ̂Th2(mt). Since our analysis is sound, no abstract
values of Th1 affect the average temperature computed by Th2. Indeed, the value of mt does not depend
on x. The flaw anticipated above is therefore detected.
A (very) simple inspection of the code suggests the designer the obvious fix to Th2, depicted in
Figure 5. Analysing this version in particular causes the following modifications to the results of Figure 4:
• adding DTh1 ∈ Σ̂Th2(mt) and FTh2 ∈Θ(Th2);
• substituting FTh2 for Σ̂Th2(tp), where the tree grammar for FTh2 has the following productions:
FTh2 → +(Temp2Th2 ,0Th2) | +(Temp2Th2 ,DTh1) | +(Temp2Th2 ,DTh2)
Now the mutual interdependence of the average temperatures computed by the two nodes is made evident
by the mutual recursion of the productions for DTh1 and DTh2 through the nonterminals FTh1 and FTh2 .
Note also that the language of DTh2 accounts for the case when Th1 only pings Th2, through the last
production FTh2→+(Temp2Th2 ,DTh2) above (the superscripts make it clear that in this case the average
is computed on the values of Th2, only).
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4 Bridging IoT-LySa and ChorGram
The first step to bridge IoT-LySa with ChorGram is compiling a system specification into a set of CF-
SMs. We give an informal account of the mapping; the technical definitions are in Appendix B; the tool
implementing the translation is available on-line [2].
Each IoT-LySa node translates to a CFSM following the three steps below:
1. replace each expression e in IoT-LySa processes with a fresh variable xe, and record the mapping
xe 7→ e in a specific environment;
2. extract from the component κ of the analysis the abstract messages and simplify them so that they
only contain tags and fresh variables as the ones computed above;
3. generate a machine for each node as follows
(a) construct for each process of a node a communicating machine (we use a procedure similar
to Thompson’s construction [3], where we use the result of steps (1) and (2));
(b) compute the parallel composition of the machines of the node in hand with the standard
product algorithm for automata;
(c) obtain the deterministic version of the product automaton computed in (b).
The communication soundness checked by ChorGram depends on the sequence of the input/output
actions of nodes regardless of the actual data exchanged. Thus, in step (1) we simplify the IoT-LySa
nodes by replacing each input/output tuple with a symbolic counterpart that includes only choice tags
and fresh variables. Furthermore, we compute also a map that records the correspondences between the
fresh variables introduced and the expressions they replace. Also, in step (2) we obtain an auxiliary
data structure that maps each node to the set of possible messages it may receive together with the
possible messages. The compilation phase in step (3) works on the simplified IoT-LySa specification
just obtained. This phase uses a mix of standard algorithms on automata (steps (3)b and (3)c) and a
customised version of Thompson’s algorithm that translates an IoT-LySa process into a non-deterministic
finite automaton (NFA). Our construction is defined by induction on the syntax and relies on automata
with a distinguished state, dubbed the terminal state, used to combine automata together. We sketch the
definition of the construction for each syntactic case:
• nil is mapped on an automaton with a single state (both initial and terminal) and no transitions;
• a conditional construct results in the union of the automata of the two branches (as usual we add
a new initial with ε-transition to the initial states of the automata of the branches automata and a
new terminal state with ε-transition from the terminal states of the automata of the branches);
1 node Th2 =
2 sensor Temp2 : f l o a t = rec h . tau ; probe ; h
3
4 process =
5 mt : = 0 ;
6 rec h .
7 snd ( temp , mt ) to [ Th1 ] ;
8 recv ( temp ; x ) ;
9 t : = Temp2 ;
10 tp : = t + x ;
11 mt : = tp / 2 ;
12 h
Figure 5: Amended version of Th2
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• iteration is translated as an automaton having a new initial state q with an ε-transition, to the initial
state of the automaton for the body of the iteration, say B, and an ε-transitions from the terminal
state of B to q (to realise the loop);
• the assignments and commands (to actuator) prefixes, require to first generate the CFSM, say M,
for the continuation of the prefix and then a new initial state q for the resulting automaton with an
ε-transition to the initial state of M;
• the receive construct is translated following the same schema above: we generate a new state and
link it to the automaton generated for the continuation; we add as many transition as the possible
senders, each of which are labelled with a string having the form A ·B?(d1, . . . ,dr) where B is
the current node, A is a possible sender (computed in step (2)), and the tuple (d1, . . . ,dr) is the
message sent;
• for the send construct snd(d1 ,..., dr) to [B1, . . . ,Bm] we add new states q0, . . . ,qm to the states of
the CFSM of the continuation (say M), we set q0 to be the initial state of the resulting machine,
and we add an ε-transition from qm to the initial state of M as well as, for each state 0 ≤ i≤ m, a
transition from qi to qi+1 labelled by A ·Bi!(d1, ...,dr) where A is the name of the current node;
• the switch construct results in the union of the automata of its branches, but the transition are
labelled with strings of the form l0sender?(d1 ,..., dr) where l0 is the current node and sender is a
possible sender (computed in step (2)).
Then, we compute the product of the automata of processes and make the overall result deterministic.
Figure 7 shows the three automata obtained for the system ACC of Section 3. Also, note that during
the compilation we order the outputs of the multicast; this is done for obtaining smaller automata and
it is faithful to the original semantics of IoT-LySa since CFSMs are asynchronous. Also, messages
on the transitions use the fresh variables generated during the construction described above (steps (1)
and (2)). For example, the message of the left-most transition of Th is 〈quit,m4〉 where according to the
correspondence computed in the encoding m4 is mapped to the constant 0 which is sent by Th1 at line 33
of Figure 3.
Note that our compilation preserves the communication pattern of IoT-LySa specification. Actually,
the encoding of a single multicast communication snd(msg) to [`1, ..., `m] introduces no communications
besides those to the nodes `1, ..., `m, in spite of linearisation, as CFSMs behave asynchronously. In
addition, although conditional statements are compiled into non-deterministic choices as usually done in
the field of static analysis, this abstraction step does not affect our results. The obtained CFSMs therefore
soundly over-approximate the communication behaviour of the given IoT-LySa specification. Summing
up, if the CFSMs enjoy a given property, e.g. deadlock-freedom, so does the original IoT-LySa system.
1 process =
2 rec h .
3 recv ( temp ; s ) ;
4 mt : = s ;
5 snd ( temp , mt ) to [ Th2 ] ;
6 h
Figure 6: A corrected version of the second process of Th1
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Figure 7: CFSMs of the amended specification ACC
5 Analysing the Interactions
Our next step is to verify communication, in particular, to detect the presence of dangling or missing mes-
sages left and of deadlocks. To do that, we use ChorGram to check if the system enjoys the generalised
multiparty compatibility (GMC) mentioned in Section 2.1 and described later. To check GMC, Chor-
Gram analyses the CFSMs of the system against their synchronous executions, that is the finite labelled
transition system (STS for short) obtained by executing the system with two additional constraints: (i) a
message could be sent only if the receiving partner is ready to consume the message and (ii) all buffers
are empty.
A system of CFSMs enjoys the GMC property when it is representable and has the branching prop-
erty [14]. The representability condition essentially requires that for each participant, the projection of
the STS onto that participant yields a CFSM bisimilar to the original machine. The branching property
condition requires that whenever a branching occurs in the STS then either (i) the branching commutes,
i.e. it corresponds to two independent (concurrent) interactions, or (ii) it corresponds to a choice that
meets the following constraints:
1. there is a single participant, dubbed the selector, that “decides” which branch to take, and
2. any participant not acting as a selector either has the same behaviour in each branch or it behaves
differently in any branch of the choice.
Item (1) guarantees that every choice is located at exactly one participant (this is crucial since we are
assuming asynchronous communications). Item (2) ensures that all the other participants are either un-
aware of the choice or, if they are involved, they can distinguish which branch is taken by the selector.
We recall that the GMC property ensures communication soundness, i.e. that systems are deadlock-free
and they are not message oblivious.
Giving the machines for ACC (cf. Section 4) as input to ChorGram we obtain the following STS:
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where, for legibility, we adopt the abbreviations used in Section 3 and omit the identities of irrelevant
states. The configurations of the STS are made of the states of the (minimised) CFSMs of ACC separated
by a dot; for instance, the left-most state in the STS above represents a configuration in which the local
state of (the CFSM of) Th1 is (the equivalence class containing the) state q30,q31, Th2 is in state q6,q7,
and Th is in state q14. This configuration, call it c, is reached when, from the initial configuration, Th1
decides to send Th the quit message, as described by the left-most transition. Note that ChorGram dec-
orates this transition with the STS with the “No choice awareness” message to highlight that a potential
violation of the branching property occurs at the source state of the transition (which is the initial state
of the STS). Indeed, configuration c has a transition to a deadlock configuration, also highlighted by
ChorGram, hence detecting a communication problem of ACC.
To investigate and fix the problem we analyse the STS and the global graph computed by ChorGram
on the machines depicted in Figure 7. Albeit not fully readable, we show the global graph in Figure 8
Figure 8: The global graph of the communication-unsound ACC
to give an idea of the complex interactions that our simple scenario generates. By inspecting this global
graph we note that there are paths to sink nodes. This is not expected of ACC since each component
is supposed to perpetually execute its loop. Therefore, those paths should be related to the reachable
deadlock configuration of the STS.
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We start by analysing the left-most path ending in the sink node of Figure 8 starting from the
initial node in the graph. This path describes a very short interaction only consisting of two exchanged
messages in which Th1 first sends message quit to Th and then receives the value of the temperature
computed by Th2. By inspecting the code in Figure 3, the attentive designer would observe that the first
interaction corresponds to the send performed by the first process of Th1 at line 33. After sending the
quit message, the first process of Th1 ends and makes the thermostat Th to terminate as well (lines 17-19
of Figure 2). Hence, the second interaction on the path under consideration can only happen between
Th2 and the second process of Th1. After sending its message Th2 waits for a reply from Th1 (line 51 of
Figure 3); however, the second process of Th1 sends no messages, it only waits for incoming ones. Thus,
a deadlock occurs because Th1 and Th2 are waiting each to receive from the other.
By inspecting the rest of the global graph, we discover that the other deadlocks are caused by the
same sequence of interactions: a deadlock occurs as soon as Th1 sends the message quit to the thermostat.
The problem arises because the second process of Th1 never acknowledges the message received by the
other thermometer. This is a violation of condition (2) of GMC (see page 50). As highlighted in the STS,
there is no choice awareness since the decision of quitting is not properly propagated to all participants.
To fix this problem we change the code of the second process Th1: we insert a send construct as shown
in Figure 6, line 5, so that the process replies to each message of Th2.
Then, we re-apply ChorGram on the new version of our system and this time ChorGram shows
it is GMC, so establishing its communication soundness. Indeed, the extra communication from Th1
to Th2 now ensures that the thermometer Th2 behaves uniformly when communicating with Th1. The
combination of the two analyses is therefore guaranteeing that our last version of ACC does not mis-
compute or mis-communicate data.
6 Conclusions
We proposed the combination of a control flow analysis and the analysis of communication soundness
based on a choreographic framework as complementary approaches for the formal verification of IoT
systems. Both analyses and the interface between them are tool supported, although the constraint solver
for the first is still under development. Our approach has been illustrated within a scenario that, albeit
conceptually simple, highlights non-trivial issues that designers of IoT applications should tackle. In-
deed, tool support is crucial in this context since the high level of non-determinism that IoT systems
exhibit makes it is hard for the designer to model robust applications.
For specifying IoT systems we appealed to IoT-LySa, a recently proposed formalism based on a
process calculus and tailored to model monitoring system made of smart devices that communicate,
make computations on sensed data, and command actuators. It is endowed with a control flow analysis
that allows the designer to identify points of the system where computations are not as expected, both on
the way data are aggregated and on the way communications occur among the smart objects.
Once the designer has attained a system correct from the point of view of local computations, com-
munication properties are verified by checking that the components of the IoT specification form a valid
choreography using the ChorGram tool. To link together the two analyses we implemented a compiler
that translates a system specification into a set of CFSMs. The compiled system soundly reflects the
communication behaviour of the original specification, ensuring that each property proved by Chor-
Gram, also holds for the IoT-LySa specification. During our experiments, ChorGram has sometimes
singled out unexpected communications. In particular, the complexity of the communication pattern of
our scenario was not fully understood before putting it under the lens of ChorGram, even though our
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working examples were conceptually simple.
This paper is a first attempt to study the entanglement between local computations and distributed
interactions. In our opinion, this issue is of uttermost relevance in IoT systems, as already discussed in
Section 1. We are currently exploring how the combination of IoT-LySa and its analysis with ChorGram
could be used for verifying more sophisticated properties of IoT systems. In particular, we believe
that the global model of an IoT system returned by ChorGram could help us in refining the results of
the control flow analysis. Indeed, the global model yields a more precise description of the flow of
data induced by actual communications than the current analysis of IoT-LySa can only approximate,
unless one makes it more complex and computationally expensive. Improving the precision of the CFA
facilitates detecting erroneous communications and misuse of data caused by them. We further plan to
investigate the definition of a modal logic for expressing and model checking a variety of properties
about communication and dependency of data on the global graph obtained by using our approach.
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A IoT-LySa Syntax
The syntax of systems is as follows.
N 3 N ::= systems of nodes
0 empty system
` : [B] single node (` ∈L )
N1 | N2 parallel composition of nodes
B 3 B ::= node components
Σ` store of node `
P process
S sensor, with a unique id i ∈I`
A actuator, with a unique id j ∈J`
B ‖ B parallel composition of components
P 3 P ::= control processes
0 inactive process
〈〈E1, · · · ,Er〉〉.L.P asynchronous multi-output L⊆L
〈〈c1, · · · ,c j,E j+1 · · ·Er〉〉.L.P asynchronous multi-output (with tags)
(E1, · · · ,E j; x j+1, · · · ,xr).P input
(c1, · · · ,c j; x j+1, · · · ,xr).P input (with tags)
(c1, · · · ,c j; x j+1, · · · ,xr).P+
(c′1, · · · ,c′j; x′j+1, · · · ,x′r).Q switch or external choice
E?P : Q conditional statement
h iteration variable
µh. P iteration
x := E.P assignment to x ∈X`
〈 j,γ〉.P output of action γ to actuator j
E 3 E ::= terms
v value (v ∈ V )
i sensor location (i ∈I`)
x variable (x ∈X`)
f (E1, · · · ,Er) function on data ( f ∈F )
S ::= sensors A ::= actuators
0 inactive sensor 0 inactive actuator
τ.S internal action τ.A internal action
probe(i).S sense a value by (| j,Γ|).A command for actuator j
the ith sensor γ.A triggered action (γ ∈ Γ)
h iteration variable h iteration variable
µh .S iteration µh .A iteration
We briefly comment on the output and input constructs. The prefix 〈〈E1, · · · ,Er〉〉 .L implements a
simple multicast communication: the tuple E1, . . . ,Er is asynchronously sent to the nodes in L. The input
prefix (E1,· · ·,E j;x j+1,· · ·,xr) receives a r-tuple, provided that its first j terms match the input ones, and
then binds the remaining store variables (separated by a “;”) to the corresponding values. Otherwise,
the r-tuple is not accepted. The present variant of IoT-LySa has external choices not originally included
in [9, 8]5 that is rendered by two branches guarded by two different input actions. Note that input and
output actions may contain tags c ∈ C .
For instance the process included in the thermostat node Th in Figure 2, is specified as follows.
PTh = µh.(temp;x).(tthreshold < x) ?
〈ACon_off,on〉.〈〈ack,on〉〉.{Th1} . h :
〈ACon_off,off〉.〈〈ack,off〉〉.{Th1} . h
+(quit; i).0
5 We recall that the switch construct can be encoded in the original presentation of IoT-LySa.
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B Mapping IoT-LySa to CFSMs
Here, we detail the procedures described in Section 4 for compiling an IoT-LySa specification into a set
of CFSMs. First, we define the simplification procedure that substitutes fresh variables for expressions
in input/output prefixes. This transformation is inductively defined on the syntax of the system of nodes:
Definition B.1. Let N be an IoT-LySa system of nodes, the procedure simpl : N →N is inductively
defined below, where we use two auxiliary functions simplB : B→B and simplP : P →P .
simpl(0) = 0
simpl(` : [B]) = ` : [simplB(B)]
simpl(N1 | N2) = simpl(N1) | simpl(N2)
simplB(P) = simplP(P)
simplB(B1 ‖ B2) = simplB(B1) ‖ simplB(B2)
simplB(X) = X for X ∈ {Σ`, S, A}
simplP(X) = X
for X ∈ {0, h}
simplP(Y.P) = Y.simplP(P)
for Y ∈ {µh, x := E, 〈 j,γ〉}
simplP(E?P1 : P2) = E ?simplP(P1) : simplP(P2)
simplP(〈〈E1, · · · ,Er〉〉.L.P) = 〈〈m1, · · · ,mr〉〉.L.simplP(P)
m1, . . . ,mr fresh variables
simplP(〈〈c1, · · · ,c j,E j+1, · · · ,Er〉〉.L.P) = 〈〈c1, · · · ,c j,m j+1, · · · ,mr〉〉.L.simplP(P)
m j+1, . . . ,mr fresh variables
simplP((E1, · · · ,E j; x j+1, · · · ,xr).P) = (m1, · · · ,m j; m j+1, · · · ,mr).simplP(P)
m1, . . . ,mr fresh variables
simplP(∑2i=1 (ci1, · · · ,cij; xij+1, · · · ,xir).Pi) = ∑2i=1 (ci1, · · · ,cij; mij+1, · · · ,mir).simplP(Pi)
mij+1, . . . ,m
i
r fresh variables
Applying the above procedure to the IoT-LySa process PT h above results in:
simplP(PTh) = µh.(temp;mx).(tthreshold < x) ?
〈ACon_off,on〉.〈〈ack,mon〉〉.{Th1} . h :
〈ACon_off,off〉.〈〈ack,moff〉〉.{Th1} . h
+(quit;mi).0
For brevity, we omitted above the straightforward computation of the environment. Indeed, it suffi-
cies modifying each procedure to return a pair whose second element is the environment; to deal with
recursive calls, e.g. in the case E?P1 : P2, we combine the returned mappings to form the overall one.
Below, we formalise the compilation of a process inside an IoT-LySa node into an automaton. This
procedure operates on processes whose input/output prefixes only contain tags and fresh variables (cf.
Definition B.1). We assume the standard definition of a finite state machine as a tuple (S,s,F,Σ,δ ). We
define the function A J_K_ that takes a process, a component κ of the CFA (modified in step 2 of Sec-
tion 4, (e.g. (Th,«ack,mon» ∈ κ(Th1) in PTh) and returns a CFSM. The obtained machine implements
the same communication behaviour of the process. For the sake of readability, in the following definition
we do not explicitly show the alphabet set of the automata (simply the union of the alphabets of the
automata returned by recursive calls and of the symbols (different from ε) occurring in the transition
relation δ ). Furthermore, when needed we assume to generate new states, e.g. si and s f .
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Definition B.2. Let P be an IoT-LySa process of the node `, and κ be the CFA component (simplified in
step 2 of Section 4). Then, the translation A J_K_ : P→K →CFSM is inductively defined as follows:
A J0Kκ = ({si},si, /0, /0)
A JhKκ = ({si, s f },si,{s f },{(si,ε,s f )})
A JY.PKκ = ({si}∪SP,si,FP,δP∪{(si,τ,sPi )})
where Y ∈ {x := E,〈 j,γ〉} and A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP)
A JE?P : QKκ = ({si,s f }∪SP∪SQ,si,{s f },δP∪δQ∪
∪{(si,ε,sPi ),(si,ε,sPi )}∪{(s,ε,s f ) | s ∈ FP∪FQ})
where A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP) and A JQKκ = (SQ,sQi ,FQ,δQ)
A J〈〈m1, · · · ,mr〉〉.L.PKκ = ({si, s1, . . . , sn}∪SP,si,FP,δP∪⋃n−1i=0 (si,ei+1,si+1)∪{(sn, ε,sPi )})
where A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP),
s1, . . . ,sn new, L = {`1, . . . , `n}
and ei+1 = ` · `i+1!«m1, . . . ,mr»
A J〈〈m1, · · · ,mr〉〉.L.PKκ = ({si, s1, . . . , sn}∪SP,si,FP,δP∪⋃n−1i=0 (si,ei+1,si+1)∪{(sn, ε,sPi )})
where A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP),
s1, . . . ,sn new, L = {`1, . . . , `n}
and ei+1 = ` · `i+1!«m1, . . . ,mr»
A J〈〈c1, · · · ,c j,m j+1, · · · ,mr〉〉.L.PKκ = ({si, s1, . . . , sn}∪SP,si,FP,δP∪⋃n−1i=0 (si,ei+1,si+1)∪{(sn, ε,sPi )})
where A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP),
s1, . . . ,sn new, L = {`1, . . . , `n}
and ei+1 = ` · `i+1!«c1, . . . ,c j,m j+1, . . . ,mr»
A J(m1, · · · ,m j; m j+1, · · · ,mr).PKκ = ({si}∪SP,si,FP,δP∪⋃(`′,t)∈κ(`)(si, ` · `′?t,sPi ))
where A JPKκ = (SP,sPi ,FP,δP)
A J∑2i=1 (ci1, · · · ,cij; mij+1, · · · ,mir).PiKκ = ({si}∪⋃2i=1 SPi ,⋃2i=1 FPi ,⋃2i=1 δPi ∪⋃(`′,t)∈κ(`)(si, ` · `′?t,sPii )
where A JPiKκ = (SPi ,sPii ,FPi ,δPi)
Applying this translation to PT h results in the right-bottom automaton in Figure 7.
